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YOU DRANK MY MILKSHAKE!
ACCUSATIONS OF WATER RIGHTS




Journalists recently described water as the new oil in both the southwest
United States and around the world.1  In the film, There Will Be Blood, the
main antagonist, Daniel Plainview, analogizes oil to milkshakes:  if someone
has a long enough straw, he can drink someone else’s milkshake.2  Similar to
the circumstances of There Will Be Blood, water, like oil, can be taken off-site
by water rights holders, resulting in conflict.3  As water supplies become
scarcer throughout the world,4 water rights takings claims may become more
common, requiring a framework to deal with the claims.
A recent water rights case, Estate of Hage v. United States,5 demonstrates
the legal issues associated with water rights takings claims.  E. Wayne and Jean
Hage owned a cattle ranch located in Nevada and grazed their cattle on adja-
cent Forest Service lands.6  The Hages had some conflicts with the Forest Ser-
vice and, in 1991, the Hages filed suit against the Forest Service, claiming that
the Forest Service committed a taking of their grazing rights, cattle, land, and
water rights by revoking their grazing permit and limiting access to water
* William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, J.D. Candidate, May
2010.  Thank you Angelo for your continuing love and support.  Special thanks to Professor
Douglas Grant, William S. Boyd School of Law, and Professor Joseph M. Feller, Arizona
State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, for their assistance with this Note.
1 Julie Ann Grimm, Private Water Pipeline Proposed for S.F., SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN,
Nov. 2, 2008, at A1; Rohini Nilekani, Is Water the Next Oil?, YALEGLOBAL ONLINE, May
31, 2007, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/water-next-oil.
2 THERE WILL BE BLOOD (Paramount Vantage and Miramax Films 2007).  The film is based
on the novel Oil! written by Upton Sinclair.  Greg Brian, There Will Be Blood:  How Upton
Sinclair’s Oil! Inspired the Acclaimed Film, ASSOCIATED CONTENT, Feb. 5, 2008, http://
www.associatedcontent.com/article/574051/there_will_be_blood_how_upton_sinclairs.
html?cat=40.
3 James H. Davenport & Craig Bell, Governmental Interference with the Use of Water:
When Do Unconstitutional “Takings” Occur?, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 31 (2005);
Andrew P. Tauriainen, California’s Evolving Water Law:  The Water Rights Protection and
Expedited Short-Term Water Transfer Act of 1999, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV.  411, 415 (2000).
4 Nilekani, supra note 1.
5 Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 202 (2008).
6 Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 153 (1996).
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sources located on Forest Service land.7  The lawsuit continued for seventeen
years, producing four decisions, but never reaching an actual conclusion.8
Finally, in the recent Estate of Hage v. United States decision, Senior Judge
Loren A. Smith of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims9 held that the Forest Ser-
vice committed both physical and regulatory takings of vested water rights in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.10  Specifically, Judge Smith found that the
fencing of spring sources on Forest Service property prevented the Hages’ cat-
tle from accessing those water sources, resulting in a physical taking of water
rights.11  Using the Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City12 bal-
ancing test, the judge found that permit requirements for maintenance of
ditches constituted a regulatory taking of water rights.13  Moreover, vegetation
clogged the ditches, sucking up water and reducing the Hages’ water supply by
up to seventy-five percent.14  Judge Smith reasoned that although the Hages
could have applied for a special use permit to clear the ditches, application for
such a permit would have been “futile” because of the bad blood between the
Hages and the Forest Service that had developed over the years.15  Therefore,
Judge Smith held that the regulation resulted in a taking because, although the
Hages never applied for the permit, it was clear that the Hages would never
have received the permit anyway.16
In spite of these findings, Judge Smith’s analysis was faulty.  Specifically,
Judge Smith incorrectly found a physical taking of water rights based on the
per se rule “that a permanent physical occupation of property is a taking.”17
However, even if the Hages’ cattle could not access any water on the grazing
allotments because of the fencing, this would only amount to a temporary act
with no physical possession during the period in which the fencing was in place
and the grazing permit was in effect.  Temporary acts that result in no physical
possession are not subject to the per se rule and courts must analyze the claim
under the Penn Central balancing test in order to determine if there is a
taking.18
7 Id. at 156.
8 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 205.  The Hages died before the conclusion of this case.
Dennis Hevesi, Wayne Hage, 69, Rancher Who Won Land Rights Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
2006, at A23.
9 The U.S. Court of Federal Claims typically handles claims for money damages based on
the Constitution, federal laws, or contracts with the United States.  U.S. Court of Federal
Claims, http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/about-court (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
10 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 211-13.
11 Id. at 211.
12 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
13 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 213; see Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124; infra Part II.B.
14 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 206.
15 Id. at 212-13.
16 Id.
17 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
18 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 335-36
(2002); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 n.12. Compare United States v. Pewee Coal Co., Inc., 341
U.S. 114, 115-16 (1951) (holding that actual physical possession, although temporary,
resulted in a taking without applying a balancing test), with United States v. Cent. Eureka
Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 165-66 (1958) (holding that there was no taking when there was
no physical possession of the mine).
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Furthermore, Judge Smith also inappropriately applied the Penn Central
balancing test in this case to find a regulatory taking of water rights.  The fac-
tors in the Penn Central test are 1) “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant,” 2) “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations,” and 3) “the character of the governmental
action.”19  Judge Smith quickly glossed over the Penn Central factors, holding
that the vegetation growth in the ditches and the Forest Service’s refusal to
allow the Hages to clear the vegetation without a permit made the ranch eco-
nomically unviable, interfered with investment-backed expectations, and was
threatening in character.20  However, the Hages had no reasonable investment-
backed expectations in clearing the ditches because the Forest Service had a
legitimate government interest in regulating the clearing of vegetation on gov-
ernment land.  This makes the Hages’ expectation that they could clear govern-
ment land without regulation unreasonable.  Also, in weighing the character of
the governmental action factor, the court should consider whether the regula-
tion is legitimate, not the nature of the relationship between the regulated party
and the regulating agency.21  If the Forest Service appeals this decision to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court will likely overturn the
regulatory and physical takings of water rights.
This Note examines both the physical and regulatory takings of water
rights found in Estate of Hage and provides an analysis of how takings law
should apply to water rights.  Part II of this Note provides a brief background of
takings law under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution with a focus on
case law involving water rights.  Parts III and IV review the history of the
Estate of Hage case and focus on the recent Estate of Hage decision, including
Judge Smith’s logic for finding that there was a taking of water rights.  In Part
V, this Note analyzes the Estate of Hage decision as applied to takings law and
congressional mandates regarding public lands, concluding that the circum-
stances in this case cannot support the physical and regulatory takings of water
rights held by Judge Smith.  Finally, Part VI concludes that because water is a
unique form of property, the courts must treat water rights taking claims differ-
ently than more traditional takings cases.
II. TAKINGS LAW BACKGROUND
A. General Takings Law
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides
protection for privately-held property with the statement “nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”22  The Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution, which applies to state governments, incorpo-
19 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
20 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 212-13.
21 Dist. Intown Props. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
22 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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rates the Takings Clause.23  However, before the Takings Clause will apply, a
court needs to determine if the plaintiff had a property right under state law.24
Takings of property can be either physical or regulatory.25  The Supreme
Court described how to differentiate between physical and regulatory takings in
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,26
in which a regional planning agency imposed two development moratoria upon
the land owners surrounding Lake Tahoe.27  There, the Supreme Court held
that the development moratoria were not physical takings but were instead
potential regulatory takings.28  According to the Supreme Court, “physical [tak-
ings] are relatively rare, easily identified, and usually represent a greater affront
to individual property rights.”29  Earlier, in the Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV Corp. case,30 the Supreme Court defined physical takings as “per-
manent physical occupation[s] of property.”31 Loretto acknowledges that
“[t]he power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most trea-
sured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”32  Accordingly, if a
regulation deprives a property owner of his or her right to exclude, there may
be a per se physical taking.33  However, physical deprivations of property can
be temporary and, in that case, the per se rule may yield to “a more complex
balancing process to determine whether [the physical deprivations of property]
are a taking.”34
If a physical act, such as the closure of a mine, is temporary and there is
no physical possession of the property, then the per se rule does not apply.  For
example, in United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co.,35 the government
ordered the closure of the Central Eureka mine.36  In that case, the Supreme
Court found that such a temporary action did not result in a taking because “the
Government did not occupy, use, or in any manner take physical possession of
the gold mines.”37  The Court balanced the interests of the government against
that of the mine owner and found that the required closure of the mine was
reasonable.38  However, in United States v. Pewee Coal Co.,39 the United
23 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (stating that private property taken without compensation violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, essentially incorporating the Takings Clause).
24 Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
25 Douglas L. Grant, ESA Reductions in Reclamation Water Contract Deliveries:  A Fifth
Amendment Taking of Property?, 36 ENVTL. L. 1331, 1361 (2006).
26 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
27 Id. at 306, 323-24.
28 Id. at 323-24.
29 Id. at 324.
30 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
31 Id. at 441.
32 Id. at 435 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979)).
33 Id. at 435-36.
34 Id. at 435 n.12. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 335-36.
35 United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
36 Id. at 156.
37 Id. at 165-66.
38 Id. at 168-69.  The Court balanced the monetary damage to the mine owners and the
government’s need to regulate the gold mine during a time of war, holding that the regula-
tion was essential to the war effort and the effect to the mine owners was incidental. Id.
39 United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
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States took physical control over a mine for a period of close to six months.40
The Supreme Court held that the occupation was a taking without applying a
balancing test because there was an “actual taking of possession and control.”41
Although Central Eureka Mining and Pewee Coal predate the per se discus-
sion in Loretto, these cases demonstrate that there is a clear distinction between
temporary physical takings resulting in physical possession and those that do
not.42  Thus, a temporary physical taking can be a simple, per se taking, but
only if there is physical possession of the property.43
On the other hand, regulatory takings are not as straightforward as physi-
cal takings.44  The Supreme Court recognized that some regulation is necessary
but “if [the] regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”45  Subse-
quent decisions have attempted to clarify when regulation has gone too far.46
For example, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,47 the South Carolina
legislature passed the Beachfront Management Act, which prohibited construc-
tion of residences within a certain designated zone along the coast.48  The regu-
lation prevented development of Lucas’s parcels as single-family residences
because they were in the designated zone; Lucas filed suit, claiming a taking of
his property.49  The Supreme Court held that if a regulation deprives a property
owner of all economic use of the property, there is a regulatory taking.50  How-
ever, the Court also held that there is no taking based on existing “restrictions
that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already
place upon land ownership.”51  In Lucas’s case, the Court ruled that compensa-
tion was required if the regulation prohibited uses “beyond what the relevant
background principles would dictate” and remanded the case.52
40 Id. at 115.
41 Id. at 115-16.
42 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 431-32 (1982) (dis-
cussing the difference between Pewee Coal and Central Eureka Mining).
43 Compare Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. at 115-16 (holding that actual physical possession,
although temporary, resulted in a taking without applying a balancing test), with Cent.
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. at 165-66 (holding that there was no taking when there was no
physical possession of the mine).
44 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (stating that a regulatory taking
occurs when the “regulation goes too far” but providing no further guidance).
45 Id.
46 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978).
47 Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003.
48 Id. at 1008-09.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1019.
51 Id. at 1029.  In Lucas, the Court gave the example of a nuclear power plant straddling an
earthquake fault, stating that such a use would not be allowed under “background principles
of the State’s law.” Id.  Such a use would never be permissible, even if it “eliminat[ed] the
land’s only economically productive use.” Id.
52 Id. at 1030, 1032.
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B. The Penn Central Test
As explained in Lucas, if a regulation does not deprive a property owner
of all economic use of the property, then the balancing test provided in Penn
Central applies.53  In Penn Central, the owner of Grand Central Terminal sued
the City of New York when the city refused, under the city’s landmarks preser-
vation law, to allow construction of an office building at the terminal site that
would exceed fifty floors in height.54  The Supreme Court identified three fac-
tors that must be balanced in order to determine if a regulatory taking has
occurred despite the fact that the owner retains some economic use of the prop-
erty:  1) “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” 2) “the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations,” and 3) “the character of the governmental action.”55  Over time,
the Supreme Court changed “distinct investment-backed expectations” to “rea-
sonable investment-backed expectations.”56
In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court held that the Penn Central
balancing test applies to temporary takings as well as regulatory takings.57
While courts need to consider all three of the Penn Central factors in a regula-
tory takings analysis,58 some courts have denied takings claims solely based on
the “reasonable investment-backed expectations” factor.59  Regardless, the
Penn Central balancing test has historically been difficult to meet.60  The
Supreme Court has only once found a temporary regulatory taking to be com-
pensable under Penn Central, and that was in a plurality opinion.61
The economic impact factor of the Penn Central test is the most straight-
forward factor, requiring that the plaintiff suffer an economic impact.62  How-
ever, if the economic impact does not deprive the property owner of all
economic use of the property, an economic impact alone is not enough to qual-
ify for a taking under the Penn Central test.63  Accordingly, the Supreme Court
has directed lower courts to focus on the other two factors in the Penn Central
balancing test when determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred.64
53 See id. at 1015; see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
54 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 116-19.
55 Id. at 124.
56 See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226 (1986); Ruckel-
shaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-10 (1984).
57 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 335-37
(2002).  The Penn Central test does not apply when there is permanent physical possession
of the property or where a regulation deprives the owner of all economic use of the property.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 441 (1982).
58 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633-34 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
59 Robert M. Washburn, “Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations” as a Factor in
Defining Property Interest, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 63, 95-96 (1996).
60 Dist. Intown Props. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(Williams, J., concurring).
61 E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 502, 528-29, 537-38 (1998).
62 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
63 Id. at 130. Lucas applies if the property owner is deprived of all economic use.  Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
64 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\10-1\NVJ107.txt unknown Seq: 7 30-MAR-10 10:37
Winter 2009] YOU DRANK MY MILKSHAKE! 191
In 2001, the Supreme Court justices disagreed regarding the definition of
reasonable investment-backed expectations, showing that the Penn Central bal-
ancing test, as a whole, is not straightforward.65  In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
the plaintiff sought a permit to fill coastal wetlands in Rhode Island where
regulations were in place protecting those wetlands.66  After the Rhode Island
Coastal Resources Management Council denied the plaintiff a permit multiple
times, the plaintiff filed suit claiming a taking of his property without just com-
pensation.67  This plurality decision revolved around the definition of reasona-
ble investment-backed expectations as applied to the Penn Central balancing
test.68  Five justices joined in the plurality opinion, including Justices
O’Connor and Scalia, but Justices O’Connor and Scalia had conflicting concur-
rences regarding the application of the reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions factor in the Penn Central balancing test.69  Justice O’Connor stated that
the Court must consider restrictions on the property existing at the time of
purchase in order to determine the owner’s reasonable investment-backed
expectations.70  Justice Scalia disagreed, stating that the existing restriction
should have no bearing on reasonable investment-backed expectations because
a court may find such a restriction unconstitutional at a later date.71  The four
dissenting justices agreed with Justice O’Connor, making Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence controlling.72  However, although Justice Scalia did not agree that
a court should consider existing regulations in determining reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations, he believed that courts must consider “background
principles of the State’s law” as required under Lucas.73  Therefore, “back-
ground principles of the State’s law” are always considered part of reasonable
investment-backed expectations analysis,74 regardless of whether the court con-
siders existing regulations as well.
Like its treatment of the other two Penn Central factors, the Court did not
define “character of the governmental action.”75  However, the Supreme
Court’s analysis focuses on the interference aspect of government actions,
65 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633-35 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring);
id. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
66 Id. at 614 (plurality opinion).
67 Id. at 615-16.
68 Id. at 610; id. at 633-35 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
69 Id. at 610 (plurality opinion); id. at 633-35 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 637 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
70 See id. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
72 Id. at 633-35 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 643 n.6, 644-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part); id. at 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); id. at
654-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Patrick A. Parenteau, Unreasonable Expectations:  Why Pal-
azzolo Has No Right to Turn a Silk Purse into a Sow’s Ear, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
101, 109 (2002).
73 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
74 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633-35 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
75 John A. Kupiec, Note, Returning to Principles of “Fairness and Justice”:  The Role of
Investment-Backed Expectations in Total Regulatory Taking Claims, 49 B.C. L. REV. 865,
866 (2008).
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rather than the actual goals of government actions, by stating that “[a] ‘taking’
may more readily be found when the interference with property can be charac-
terized as a physical invasion by [the] government . . . than when interference
arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of eco-
nomic life to promote the common good.”76  Subsequently, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has refined the character of the
governmental action factor even further.  Specifically, in District Intown
Properties Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia,77 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered a case very similar to
Penn Central in which the mayor for the District of Columbia denied develop-
ment permits for a cathedral protected by the local landmark protection law.78
In addressing the character of the governmental action, the court held that all
courts must consider the legitimacy of the regulation in applying the Penn Cen-
tral test.79  Therefore, at a minimum, the courts must consider “background
principles of the State’s law” and the legitimacy of the regulation when apply-
ing the Penn Central balancing test.80
C. Water Rights and Takings Law
Water rights pose an interesting challenge to traditional takings law
because they are considered usufructuary, not possessory like land or other
property.81  However, the Supreme Court has recognized that water rights are
property rights82 and has addressed the physical taking of water rights in three
cases.83  First, in International Paper v. United States,84 the government
ordered termination of a leased water diversion to International Paper Company
in order to increase power production in the Niagara River, shutting down the
International Paper mill for approximately nine months.85  The government
argued that it terminated the diversion under agreement, but the Court found
that the government used its eminent domain powers instead.86  The Supreme
Court held that termination of the diversion was a taking, requiring just com-
pensation under the Constitution.87  Second, in United States v. Gerlach Live
Stock,88 the government constructed Friant Dam, which diverted water away
76 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citation omitted).
77 Dist. Intown Props. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
78 Id. at 876.
79 Id. at 879.
80 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633-35 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at
637 (Scalia, J., concurring); Dist. Intown Props., 198 F.3d at 879-80; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
81 Davenport & Bell, supra note 3, at 32.
82 Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 460-61 (1922), vacated on other grounds, 353 U.S.
953 (1957).  In addition, the Nevada Supreme Court held that vested water rights are real
property rights, although the rights are still subject to police power.  Town of Eureka v. State
Eng’r, 826 P.2d 948, 951 (Nev. 1992).
83 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S.
725 (1950); Int’l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931).
84 Int’l Paper Co., 282 U.S. 399.
85 Id. at 404-06.
86 Id. at 407.
87 Id. at 408.
88 Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725.
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from the plaintiff, a live stock production company.89  The Court reasoned that
actions for the public’s benefit do not justify the taking of private water rights
without compensation.90  Although the Court found that the dam allowed
water-rights holders to use water more efficiently, it still held that the diversion
of water rights was a taking based on California law.91  Third, Dugan v. Rank92
also involved water rights blocked by the Friant Dam.93  Similar to Gerlach,
the Supreme Court found that the government’s actions constituted a taking of
water rights.94  The Court reasoned that “[a] seizure of water rights need not
necessarily be a physical invasion of land.”95
Despite these three Supreme Court cases, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held in County of Okanogan v. National Marine Fisheries Service96
that the government still has a right to restrict access to vested water rights
across government-owned land.97  In County of Okanogan, plaintiffs alleged
that the Forest Service took their vested water rights without just compensation
by amending the plaintiffs’ right-of-way permit to limit diversions.98  Specifi-
cally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that there was no taking of
water rights because the Forest Service “had the authority to restrict the use of
[revocable] rights-of-way” over Forest Service land which allowed for the
transportation of water.99
Finally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently held in
Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States100 that diversion of water for
government use constituted a physical taking.101  In Casitas, the Bureau of
Reclamation required the Casitas Municipal Water District to divert its con-
tracted water right in order to meet federal requirements under the Endangered
Species Act, resulting in a permanent loss of water to Casitas.102  The Federal
Circuit found that the diversion was a partial taking of water rights, requiring
just compensation, because Casitas had a contracted water right and the govern-
ment physically appropriated the property.103
Estate of Hage, as discussed in Part V, differs significantly from Interna-
tional Paper, Gerlach Live Stock, Dugan, and Casitas, cases in which courts
upheld water-rights-takings claims, because Estate of Hage did not involve any
physical diversion of water away from the owner.104  Like other property, the
89 See id. at 728-30.
90 Id. at 752.
91 Id. at 731, 752, 754-55.
92 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
93 Id. at 615.
94 Id. at 620.
95 Id. at 625.
96 County of Okanogan v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2003).
97 Id. at 1084-85.
98 Id. at 1084.
99 Id. at 1085.
100 Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
101 Id. at 1295.
102 Id. at 1281-82.
103 Id. at 1281-82, 1295.
104 Compare, e.g., id. at 1282 (in which a physical diversion of water was required by the
Bureau of Reclamation), with Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 206 (2008)
(in which there was no physical diversion, only fencing and vegetation growth in ditches).
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physical taking of water rights requires physical occupation, such as a diver-
sion.105  Without such a diversion, the per se rule for taking cannot be applied
and any takings analysis must be conducted under the Penn Central balancing
test.106
III. HISTORY OF THE ESTATE OF HAGE Case
E. Wayne and Jean Hage purchased Pine Creek Ranch located in Nevada
in 1978 for the purpose of cattle ranching.107  Previous owners established the
7000-acre ranch in 1865.108  However, additional land beyond the 7000 acres
was necessary to graze the cattle and the Hages obtained a grazing permit with
a ten-year term along with the purchase of the ranch.109  The grazing permit
covered 752,000 acres of land owned by the Forest Service.110  The terms of
the grazing permit gave the Hages access to federal land, but also allowed the
Forest Service to terminate the permit if the Hages violated any terms of the
permit or if the Forest Service needed the land for another use.111  The terms of
the permit limited the amount of cattle allowed on each allotment in order to
prevent overgrazing.112
In purchasing the ranch, the Hages also obtained ownership of vested
water rights through ten ditch rights-of-way that the federal government
granted under the Ditch Act of 1866.113  Those ditches were located on Forest
Service land but provided water to the Hages’ ranch.114  As with most property
rights, state law governs water rights, such as those of the Hages, and in
Nevada the prior appropriation doctrine applies.115  Under that doctrine, first in
time, first in right is the mantra.116  As explained by Judge Smith, “the date of
the appropriation determines the appropriator’s priority to use the water, with
the earliest user having the superior right.”117  Under prior appropriation, the
water does not actually have to be located on the owner’s property; there can be
ownership of water rights that are physically located off-site like the Hages’
water rights.118
105 See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
106 See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
107 Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 153 (1996).
108 Id.
109 Id.  Upon purchase of the ranch in 1978, the grazing permit entitled the Hages to eight
years remaining on the previous owner’s permit. Id. at 153 n.1.  The Hages modified and
renewed the permit in 1984. Id. at 153.
110 Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 588 (2002).
111 Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 153.
112 Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 206 (2008); Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 153.
113 43 U.S.C. § 661 (2006); Hage, 51 Fed. Cl. at 583; Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 156.
114 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 205.
115 Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 172.
116 A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation:  Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. REV.
881, 881 (2000).
117 Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 172; see also Tarlock, supra note 116, at 881-82.
118 Davenport & Bell, supra note 3, at 31.
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A. You Fenced My Milkshake!
In 1979, the Nevada Department of Wildlife released elk into the Table
Mountain Allotment where the Hages also grazed their cattle.119  The Forest
Service also “fenced off certain meadows and spring sources on the Table
Mountain allotment and erected electric fences,” excluding the Hages’ cattle
from those areas.120  The fences did not exclude the elk because the elk could
jump the fences.121  In 1990, the Forest Service determined that an allotment
within the Hages’ grazing permit was overgrazed in violation of the permit and
revoked the Hages’ grazing permit for that area.122  When the cattle continued
to graze on the revoked allotment, the Forest Service impounded the cattle.123
B. You Regulated My Milkshake!
In addition to the issues with the grazing permit, in 1986, Congress passed
a statute granting the Forest Service authority to regulate the maintenance of
ditches on Department of Agriculture lands, which includes Forest Service
lands.124  The statute states:
The Secretary of Agriculture shall have the authority to administer all rights-of-way
granted or issued under authority of previous Acts with respect to lands under the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agriculture, including rights-of-way granted or issued
pursuant to authority given to the Secretary of the Interior by such previous Acts.125
The Forest Service then promulgated regulations granting the Chief of the For-
est Service the authority to require special permits for ditches on Forest Service
land.126  The Forest Service required the Hages to obtain a special permit in
order to clear the ditches with mechanized equipment.127  However, the Hages
could clear the ditches legally without a permit if they only used hand tools.128
The Hages refused to apply for the permit and water flow from the ditches
decreased due to vegetation clogging the ditches.129  The Forest Service
enforced the regulation by arresting Mr. Hage in 1991 for cutting trees around
the ditches without a permit.130  A jury convicted Mr. Hage of violating 18
U.S.C. § 1361, which makes it a felony to damage government property
exceeding $100, and 18 U.S.C. § 641, which makes it a felony to sell govern-
ment property exceeding $100 without permission.131  However, the Ninth Cir-
119 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 206.
120 Id.
121 Id.  Although not explicitly stated in the Estate of Hage decision, the Forest Service
likely erected the fences so that the elk would not have to compete with cattle for water.
122 Id. at 206, 215; Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 155.
123 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 206-07.
124 43 U.S.C. § 1761(b)(3) (2006).  The Forest Service is an agency of the U.S. Department
of Agriculture.  U.S. Forest Service, http://www.fs.fed.us/aboutus/ (last visited October 27,
2008).
125 43 U.S.C. § 1761(b)(3).
126 36 C.F.R. § 251.53(l)(1) (2008).
127 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 212.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 212-13.
130 Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 156 (1996).
131 United States v. Seaman, 18 F.3d 649, 650 (9th Cir. 1994); see 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 1361
(1988).
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cuit Court of Appeals overturned the conviction because the value of the trees
was less than $100 and Mr. Hage merely committed a misdemeanor.132
The Hages filed a claim against the Forest Service in September 1991,
claiming that the Forest Service committed a taking of their grazing rights,
cattle, land, and water rights.133  The Forest Service filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment on all the claims, which Judge Smith granted regarding the
grazing rights, but denied regarding all the other claims.134  In terms of the
water rights, Judge Smith determined that the Hages had vested water rights
based on the Ditch Act of 1866.135  However, Judge Smith postponed the deci-
sion on water rights takings until 2008.136
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The 2008 Estate of Hage decision is the last Federal Claims Court deci-
sion in a series of five opinions over twelve years.137  Judge Smith identified
the purpose of this last opinion:  to determine if the Forest Service actions con-
stituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment, and if so, what compensation was
due to the Hages for the taking.138  Applying the facts of the case as described
above, Judge Smith held that the cattle impoundment was not a taking because
the Forest Service was within its discretion in revoking the grazing permit and
impounding the cattle.139  Similarly, Judge Smith ruled that revocation of the
grazing permit did not result in a taking of the ranch because the Forest Service
had a right to revoke the permit at any time.140  In reaching this decision, he
cited Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States,141 which held that a grazing permit is
a license and that loss of value associated with losing such a license is not a
“cognizable property interest.”142  However, Judge Smith found that the fenc-
ing of water sources on the Table Mountain Allotment and reduction in water
132 Seaman, 18 F.3d at 650-51.
133 Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 156.
134 Id. at 150.
135 Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 576 (2002); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.085
(2008) (protects vested water rights); Bradshaw v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 549, 552 (2000)
(“Under Nevada law, a vested water right is one that was used continuously prior to 1905 to
the present and is specifically protected by statute.”).
136 Hage, 51 Fed. Cl. at 584, 592.  In the 2008 decision, Judge Smith stated that the court
“already held . . . that the Government’s actions which physically prevented Plaintiffs from
accessing their 1866 Act ditches amounted to a physical taking,” citing to footnote thirteen
in the 2002 decision.  Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 208 (2008).  How-
ever, footnote thirteen in the 2002 decision only recognizes it as a physical takings claim and
the 2002 decision explicitly states that the water-rights-takings issue will be dealt with in a
future phase of the case. Hage, 51 Fed. Cl. at 580 n.13, 584, 592.  Judge Smith confined the
analysis for both physical and regulatory takings of water rights to the 2008 decision. Estate
of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 210-13.
137 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 205 n.1.
138 Id. at 205.
139 Id. at 209.
140 Id.
141 Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
142 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 209 (citing Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 808).
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flow from the ditches resulted in a taking of water rights under the
circumstances.143
A. Two-Prong Test for Water Rights Takings
Judge Smith recognized that the revocation of the grazing permit could not
support a taking of water rights under the holding in Colvin Cattle.144  Instead,
Judge Smith developed a two-prong test for water takings:  1) there must be a
beneficial use for the water, and 2) “the Government’s actions [must rise] to the
level of a taking.”145  When both prongs are satisfied, Judge Smith held that the
action resulted in a taking.146
In terms of the first prong, Judge Smith found that the Hages could have
used the water to irrigate agricultural lands or could have sold the water rights,
thus showing beneficial use.147  However, the takings analysis under the second
prong proved to be more complex.148  Judge Smith analyzed the fencing of
water sources under a physical taking framework.149  He also separately ana-
lyzed the Forest Service regulation as a regulatory taking, considering both the
actual surface water and the ditches that transport the water as property.150
B. Physical Taking
Judge Smith held that the government action rose to the level of a physical
taking because the fencing of “certain meadows and spring sources” resulted in
a “‘physical ouster’ which deprived [the Hages] of the use of their property”
during the period when the grazing permit was still in effect.151  Judge Smith
acknowledged that revocation of the grazing permit could not constitute a phys-
ical taking under Colvin Cattle.152  In Colvin Cattle, the Bureau of Land Man-
agement (BLM) revoked a grazing permit and the affected rancher sought
damages.153  Although the rancher could no longer legally graze the land, the
BLM did not restrict the rancher’s access to water.154  Judge Smith distin-
guished the Hages’ situation from Colvin Cattle because there was actual fenc-
ing of water sources and possible prosecution implications for the Hages, as
demonstrated by the Forest Service’s prior charges against Mr. Hage.155
143 Id. at 211.
144 Id. at 210-11.
145 Id. at 210.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 210, 212.
148 Id. at 211-13.
149 Id. at 211.
150 Id. at 211-13.
151 Id. at 206, 211.  Judge Smith did not clarify whether the holding of a physical taking was
based on Loretto, Lucas, or some other case.  For the purposes of this Note, I assume that the
physical taking holding was based on Loretto because Lucas applies to regulatory takings.
See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
152 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 211.
153 Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 806 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
154 Id.
155 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 211; see United States v. Seaman, 18 F.3d 649, 650 (9th
Cir. 1994).
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C. Regulatory Taking of Surface Water
In analyzing the regulatory taking claim for surface water, Judge Smith
applied the Penn Central balancing test and held that the reduction in water
flow needed for irrigation had an economic impact, meeting the first factor of
the Penn Central test.156  Judge Smith also found that the Hages had invest-
ment-backed expectations because the Hages would not have purchased the
ranch without the water rights.157  Finally, Judge Smith found that the character
of the governmental action was actually “the threats and intimidation that per-
vaded the relationship between [the Hages] and the Forest Service,” not the
vegetation growth.158
D. Regulatory Taking of Ditches
For the determination of whether there was a regulatory taking of the
ditches, Judge Smith also applied the Penn Central balancing test with the
same results.159  He reasoned that the economic impact was severe because of
the cost associated with clearing the ditches by hand, which is the only way the
Hages could clear the ditches legally without a permit.160  Additionally, Judge
Smith held that the Hages had investment-backed expectations in the ditches as
the ranch’s water transport system.161  Finally, Judge Smith found that the
character of the governmental action in requiring the permit for clearing was
harassment of the Hages.162  Although Judge Smith acknowledged that the
Hages could have applied for a permit to clear the ditches mechanically, and
that the Forest Service could reasonably regulate the ditches, he nevertheless
ruled that the “application for a special use permit to maintain their ditches with
the appropriate equipment would clearly have been futile” because of the poor
relationship between the Forest Service and the Hages.163  In the end, Judge
Smith awarded nearly $3 million in damages to the Hages’ estate in compensa-
tion for the water rights.164
V. ANALYSIS
Physical takings are uncommon and obvious.165  In addition, under the per
se rule of Loretto, physical takings cannot be found in cases which the act in
question is only temporary with no physical occupation.166  Thus, Judge Smith
incorrectly applied the per se rule to an action that was only temporary with no
156 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 212.
157 Id.
158 Id.




163 Id. at 212-13.
164 Id. at 216.
165 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324
(2002).
166 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 431-32, 435 n.12
(1982).
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physical occupation in Estate of Hage.167  In the Hages’ case, the fencing only
limited access for the Hages’ cattle temporarily during the period when the
grazing permit was in effect.168  Moreover, the fencing of flowing, moving
water rights is not a physical occupation because water rights are usufructuary,
not possessory.169  On appeal, the court should apply the Penn Central balanc-
ing test instead.170
If the Forest Service appeals Judge Smith’s decision, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit should not find a regulatory taking under the
Penn Central balancing test because the Hages had no reasonable investment-
backed expectation that the Forest Service would not regulate removal of vege-
tation on government land.  Judge Smith acknowledged that the Forest Service
could regulate the ditches in a reasonable manner, but concluded that the Forest
Service effectively denied the permit because application for the permit would
have been “futile.”171  Judge Smith held that the effective denial of the permit
resulted in a taking.172  Judge Smith’s reasoning is inconsistent with takings
law, which requires consideration of the “background principles of the State’s
law of property and nuisance.”173  These background principles include regula-
tion of public lands as well as regulation of water rights.  Although state law
considers water rights as equivalent to real property in Nevada,174 water rights
are also a public resource.175  As it can with many other property rights, the
government can regulate water rights for public purposes.176  As stated by
David Abelson, a water rights attorney, “Investment-backed expectations are
not reasonable if they fail to acknowledge the power of the government to
regulate in the public interest.”177  The Forest Service is required to manage its
rangelands in the public interest, balancing multiple uses that benefit all
167 See Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 211 (admitting that the physical taking “pertains only
to a limited time period”); Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 172 (1996) (admitting that
“[f]lowing water . . . is not amenable to absolute physical possession”). Compare United
States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115-16 (1951) (holding that actual physical posses-
sion, although temporary, resulted in a taking without applying a balancing test), with United
States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 165-66 (1958) (holding that there was no
taking when there was no physical possession of the mine).
168 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 211 (stating that physical taking was only for “a limited
time period” because the taking ended when the grazing permit was revoked).
169 Davenport & Bell, supra note 3, at 33; Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights
and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 260 (1990) (stating that water rights
are different from typical property rights for a variety of reasons).
170 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 335-36.
171 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 212-13.
172 Id. at 213.
173 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 637 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring); Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
174 Town of Eureka v. State Eng’r, 826 P.2d 948, 951 (Nev. 1992).
175 NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025 (2007) (“The water of all sources of water supply within the
boundaries of the State whether above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the
public.”); see, e.g., Bergman v. Kearney, 241 F. 884, 893 (D. Nev. 1917).
176 David Abelson, Comment, Water Rights and Grazing Permits:  Transforming Public
Lands into Private Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 407, 422 (1994).
177 Id. at 417.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\10-1\NVJ107.txt unknown Seq: 16 30-MAR-10 10:37
200 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:185
users.178  Therefore, the Hages cannot claim that their water rights transcend
any Forest Service regulation promulgated in the public interest.
Finally, Judge Smith should have considered the legitimacy of the govern-
ment action in determining its character, not the demeanor of agency staff.  The
courts typically apply the character of the governmental action to the regulation
itself.179  Assuming that the Forest Service effectively denied the permit, Judge
Smith should have determined if the regulation was legitimate, not if the Forest
Service had some sort of vendetta against the Hages.  Because the regulation is
consistent with current federal law requiring federal agencies to manage federal
lands “under the principles of multiple use and sustained yield,” Judge Smith
should have found that the character of the governmental action was
legitimate.180
A. Physical Taking Analysis
The Hages had a water right through their cattle,181 which was within the
grazing allotment, but did not have a permanent right to access that water.
Under Nevada state law, cattle drinking water out of a stream is a diversion and
an appropriation of water;182 therefore, cattle drinking water from the streams
on the allotment constituted a water right for the Hages.  Judge Smith made
findings of fact that the fencing completely excluded the Hages’ cattle from
diverting their appropriated water rights within the grazing allotment.183
Assuming that the fencing prevented the cattle from accessing any water
sources on the grazing allotment, water rights alone do not guarantee that the
Hages’ cattle will have access to the water because “access across federal land
is not part of an irrigators’ right to water.”184  The Hages did not own the land
surrounding the water sources; the Forest Service owned it.185  Although the
Hages had vested water rights under the Ditch Act of 1866, they did not have
vested rights to access the springs and meadows that the Forest Service
178 Public Rangelands Improvement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1901(b)(2) (2006) (requiring federal
agencies to “manage, maintain and improve the conditions of the public rangelands so that
they become as productive as feasible for all rangeland values in accordance with manage-
ment objectives”).
179 Dist. Intown Props. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987) &
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982)).
180 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2006).
181 See Steptoe Live Stock Co. v. Gulley, 295 P. 772, 775-76 (Nev. 1931).
182 Id.
183 Although it is difficult to believe that the Forest Service could accomplish the onerous
task of installing electric fences to exclude the cattle from all water sources on the Table
Mountain Allotment, Judge Smith made finding of facts to that effect that will be difficult to
challenge in future appeals.  Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 206, 211
(2008).
184 Davenport & Bell, supra note 3, at 37.
185 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 205.  The water source was located in the Toiyabe
National Forest owned by the Forest Service. Id.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\10-1\NVJ107.txt unknown Seq: 17 30-MAR-10 10:37
Winter 2009] YOU DRANK MY MILKSHAKE! 201
fenced.186  The vested right is in the water itself that flows to the ranch, not in
the access across federal land.187
The fencing was only temporary because the grazing permit that gave the
Hages access to the water was a revocable license, giving them no right to
access the property without the grazing permit.188  A court must analyze tem-
porary actions under the Penn Central balancing test.189  Like in County of
Okanagon, where the plaintiffs could not assert a taking of water rights because
access depended upon a revocable right-of-way, there is no taking of water
rights associated with revocation of a grazing permit because the government
has the right to restrict revocable permits, even if it results in lack of access to
off-site water.190  Judge Smith agreed with this principle.191  In this case, fenc-
ing only affected the cattle’s access to water from 1979 until the cancellation of
the grazing permit in 1990.192  The Hages lost their right to access the water
when they lost the grazing permit, creating only a temporary impact on their
rights.
In addition to involving only a temporary action, there was also no physi-
cal occupation of the water rights in Estate of Hage.  The fencing of a water
source is not a typical and obvious physical taking, which the courts should
consider when applying traditional takings law to water rights.  In typical phys-
ical takings, “the government directly appropriates private property for its own
use.”193  Here, water sources were fenced in order to supply water for elk.194
Although the Hages had a private property right to the water under Nevada
law,195 the act of fencing water sources was certainly not a direct appropriation
of water like an actual diversion.196  At best, it is an indirect appropriation of
186 See County of Okanogan v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir.
2003) (stating that a government limitation on diversions as part of a revocable right-of-way
permit did not amount to a taking of water rights).  The Nevada Supreme Court also consid-
ers water rights and access to public lands to be separate.  Ansolabehere v. Laborde, 310
P.2d 842, 849 (Nev. 1957).
187 Davenport & Bell, supra note 3, at 37.
188 Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 153 (1996).
189 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 335-36
(2002).
190 County of Okanogan, 347 F.3d at 1085.
191 Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 211 (2008) (stating that the physical
taking was only for “a limited time period” because the taking ended when the grazing
permit was revoked).
192 Id. at 215; Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 154-55.
193 E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522 (1998).
194 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 206.  Some may argue that the elk are diverting the water
for the government, resulting in a taking.  However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that animals cannot be agents for the government.  Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1335
(9th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he government is not answerable for the conduct of the bears in taking
plaintiffs’ property.”).
195 See Steptoe Live Stock Co. v. Gulley, 295 P. 772, 775-76 (Nev. 1931).
196 See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 615, 620 (1963); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock
Co., 339 U.S. 725, 729-30, 752 (1950); Int’l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 405-
06, 408 (1931).  All three cases found physical takings of water but, unlike this case,
involved diversions.
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water by the elk, which does not fit the typical physical taking mold described
in the Tahoe-Sierra case.197
Temporary physical takings with no physical occupation require “a more
complex balancing process to determine whether they are a taking.”198  The
categorical per se rule under Loretto does not apply to a temporary fencing of
water sources with no physical occupation because of the rationale the Court
applied in Pewee Coal and Central Eureka Mining, as explained above.199  The
Supreme Court held that lower courts should use the Penn Central balancing
test to determine temporary takings, the same test as required to analyze partial
regulatory takings.200  Therefore, Judge Smith should have applied the Penn
Central balancing test to the fencing in Estate of Hage because it resulted in a
temporary physical act with no physical occupation.
B. Penn Central Analysis
In Estate of Hage, Judge Smith considered the reduced flow of the water
via the ditches to the Hages’ ranch to be a regulatory taking because the Hages
could not legally clear the vegetation in the ditches mechanically without a
permit.201  Because the Hages were still receiving some water, the permit regu-
lation could not have resulted in a complete regulatory taking of all economic
use under Lucas.202  Instead, courts must apply the Penn Central factors to
determine if there is a taking when the owner has not lost all economic use of
his or her property.203
In applying the Penn Central factors to this case, Judge Smith considered
the economic impact of the regulation, the Hages’ investment-backed expecta-
tions, and the character of the governmental action.204  Even if Judge Smith
assumed that the Forest Service effectively denied the permit to clear the
ditches, he incorrectly applied the Penn Central balancing test in finding that
all three factors balanced in favor of the Hages.  Acknowledging that the
ditches were subject to reasonable regulation,205 Judge Smith incorrectly held
that the Hages had a reasonable investment-backed expectation in clearing pub-
197 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324
(2002).
198 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 n.12 (1982). Com-
pare United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115-16 (1951) (holding that actual
physical possession, although temporary, resulted in a taking without applying a balancing
test), with United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 165-66 (1958) (holding
that there was no taking when there was no physical possession of the mine).
199 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 n.12. Compare Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. at 115-16 (holding
that actual physical possession, although temporary, resulted in a taking without applying a
balancing test), with Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. at 165-66 (holding that there was no
taking when there was no physical possession of the mine).
200 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 335-36.
201 Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 212-13 (2008).
202 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
203 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 212; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978).
204 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 212-13.
205 Id. at 212.
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lic lands without a permit and that the character of the governmental action was
improper.206
1. Economic Impact
Assuming that the Forest Service effectively denied the Hages a permit to
clear the ditches because of their poor relationship with the Forest Service, the
Hages suffered an economic impact because they were unable to clear the
ditches mechanically.207  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held
that denial of a grazing permit does not result in a loss of value to private
property when there were no “governmental restrictions on a constitutionally
cognizable property interest.”208  This is because, under the Taylor Grazing
Act, grazing permits are not compensable property.209  As mentioned before,
the Hages had no property interest in their grazing permit because it was a
revocable license.210  However, denial of the permit to clear the ditches is a
different situation than denial of a grazing permit because, under Nevada state
law, the Hages had a property interest in the vested water rights that they
obtained through the 1866 Ditch Act.211  Judge Smith established that vegeta-
tion growth diminished the water flow to the ranch and that the Hages were
economically impacted by the reduction in their ability to irrigate.212  In addi-
tion, the Hages would suffer an economic impact in hand-clearing the
ditches.213  Therefore, the Hages met the Penn Central factor for economic
impact.  Although this factor balances in favor of the Hages, it is not enough,
on its own, to demonstrate a regulatory taking.214
2. Investment-backed Expectations
Judge Smith incorrectly held that the Hages had reasonable investment-
backed expectations.  In fact, the Hages had no reasonable investment-backed
expectations in obtaining permission to clear vegetation on Forest Service land
because investment-backed expectations are not reasonable when they ignore
the right of the government to regulate its own land.215  The government has
authority to regulate uses on its own land, which a court must consider as part
of the Hages’ investment-backed expectations.216  In addition, Congress
206 When the Hages first filed suit against the Forest Service, the government argued that
the claim was not ripe for adjudication because the Hages did not apply for the special-use
permit to maintain their ditches.  Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 161 (1996).  How-
ever, Judge Smith held that the plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed “if plaintiffs can
establish that the procedure to acquire a permit is so burdensome as to effectively deprive
plaintiffs of their property rights.” Id. at 164.
207 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 212-13.
208 Colvin Cattle Co., Inc. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
209 United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973).
210 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 210; Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 153.
211 Town of Eureka v. State Eng’r, 826 P.2d 948, 951 (Nev. 1992).
212 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 210 (stating that the Hages could have beneficially used
the water or sold the water rights for irrigation purposes).
213 Id. at 213.
214 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
215 Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023, 1033 (3d Cir. 1987).
216 See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911) (“The United States can prohibit
absolutely or fix the terms on which its property may be used.”).
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promulgated the Public Rangelands Improvement Act, stating that the national
policy for Forest Service and other federal agencies is to “manage, maintain
and improve the condition of the public rangelands so that they become as
productive as feasible for all rangeland values in accordance with management
objectives.”217  Therefore, the Hages had no reasonable investment-backed
expectation that the Forest Service would manage the adjacent Forest Service
lands for the Hages’ grazing and water rights alone.  Congress directed the
Forest Service to provide for “all rangeland values,” and the Forest Service, in
doing so, promulgated a reasonable regulation to require permits before clear-
ing of public lands.218  This allows the Forest Service to manage lands for
wildlife and other public land uses that may be required under federal law.219
Nor did the Hages have a reasonable expectation that the Forest Service
would not regulate the water rights, either directly or indirectly.  As acknowl-
edged by Judge Smith, water rights are usufructuary, not possessory.220  In
1938, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit provided a
concise and thorough statement of this principle:  “While the owner of a water
right has a vested interest in that right, the right itself is something less than the
full ownership of property because it is a right not to the corpus of the water but
to the use of the water.”221  Moreover, state law typically divides water sources
among various users who each have a right to use a specified amount of water
for beneficial use.222  It is impossible to assign each molecule of water to a
certain user.  Finally, a water right holder is not entitled to use a water right free
of any regulation.223  Water rights are subject to the beneficial use doctrine
where a water right holder must put his water right to beneficial use or risk use
by another water user.224  In addition, under Nevada law, water is a public
resource and, as such, water rights are subject to reasonable regulation.225
Because appropriated water rights, even vested ones, are subject to the benefi-
cial use doctrine and regulations for public use, the Hages had no reasonable
expectation that their water rights would continue to flow without additional
permit requirements or regulations.
Furthermore, it does not matter that the Forest Service promulgated a reg-
ulation requiring a permit after the Hages’ purchase of the ranch.  According to
Lucas, “reasonable expectations must be understood in light of the whole of
our legal tradition.”226  In Lucas, zoning regulations came into effect after the
217 Public Rangelands Improvement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1901(b)(2) (2006).
218 Id.; 36 C.F.R. § 251.53(l)(1) (2008).
219 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006) (“Each Federal
agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species . . . .”).
220 Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 211 (2008).
221 Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
222 Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
1, 4 (2002) (explaining that water is a common resource “shared . . . by water right holders
and other consumptive users”).
223 Bergman v. Kearney, 241 F. 884, 893 (D. Nev. 1917).
224 Andrew H. Sawyer, Changing Landscape and Evolving Law:  Lessons from Mono Lake
on Takings and the Public Trust, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 311, 343 (1997).
225 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025 (2008).
226 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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plaintiff had purchased the property.227  Nonetheless, the Court still held that,
based on the facts of the case, there was no taking of property, acknowledging
that property law cannot be static.228  States should have flexibility to regulate
in response to changing conditions.229  Thus, the Hages cannot claim that they
expected the Forest Service to never regulate the clearing of vegetation from
government land in the future, even though the regulation was not in place
when the Hages purchased the property.230  Therefore, the Hages did not have
reasonable investment-backed expectations that clearing of Forest Service land
would not be regulated in the future.
3. Character of the Governmental Action
It was inappropriate for Judge Smith to hold that the character of the gov-
ernmental action was not valid based on purported “threats and intimidation”
by the Forest Service.231  Although the Court never clearly defined the term
“character of the governmental action,”232 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit has held that “the character of the governmental
action depends both on whether the government has legitimized a physical
occupation of the property . . . and whether the regulation has a legitimate
public purpose.”233  Here, the court must weigh effective denial of the permit
against the legitimacy of the regulation.  The Forest Service regulation was a
general regulation brought about to control private activities on public lands
through the issuance of permits.234  Therefore, it did not regulate the Hages’
water rights specifically and the Forest Service did not promulgate the regula-
tion as a vengeful act against the Hages, as Judge Smith suggested.235  The
regulation applied to the entire National Forest System and was consistent with
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, which requires the For-
est Service and other federal agencies to manage federal lands “under princi-
ples of multiple use and sustained yield.”236  Although the Forest Service had
the discretion to require the permit or not,237 the regulation did have a legiti-
mate public purpose in regulating uses on public lands that are subject to multi-
ple uses and mandates beyond just grazing of cattle.238  In weighing the
character of the governmental action, Judge Smith should have not focused on
the Forest Service’s purported vengeance towards the Hages, but rather,
whether the Forest Service was regulating uses on public lands consistent with
227 Id. at 1008 (majority opinion).
228 Id. at 1032; id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
229 Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
230 Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 153, 156 (1996).
231 Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 212 (2008).
232 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Kupiec, supra note
75, at 866.
233 Dist. Intown Props. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(emphasis and citations omitted).
234 36 C.F.R. § 251.53 (2008).
235 Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 153, 156.
236 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2006); 36
C.F.R. § 251.53.
237 36 C.F.R. § 251.53.
238 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a); see generally 43 U.S.C. §§ 1751-53.
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congressional mandate.239  Although Judge Smith correctly refused to consider
the growth of vegetation to determine the character of the governmental
action,240 he incorrectly applied the character of the governmental action factor
to the relationship between the Hages and the Forest Service.  Instead, Judge
Smith should have applied the character of the governmental action factor to
the regulation itself, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit did, and held that the character of the governmental action was
legitimate.241
C. The Future of Estate of Hage
If the Forest Service appeals this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, the court will likely reverse the finding of a taking of water
rights.  Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will more
than likely accept the factual findings made by Judge Smith that the Forest
Service erected electric fences, preventing cattle from accessing all water
sources within the Table Mountain Allotment,242 the court will likely recognize
that this was only a temporary taking with no physical occupation, which
should have been analyzed under the Penn Central balancing test.  The Penn
Central factors for a compensable temporary taking will be difficult to meet
considering that the Forest Service has a public mandate to manage public
lands for multiple uses and “all rangeland values,” which includes maintenance
of wildlife habitat.243
Moreover, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will also
likely find that there was no regulatory taking of water rights under the Penn
Central balancing test because:  1) the Hages had no reasonable expectation
that the Forest Service would forego regulating activities on its own land, and
2) the character of the governmental action was legitimate.  Congress has
directed the federal land management agencies, including the Forest Service, to
regulate rangelands for all viable public uses.244  Therefore, it was not reasona-
ble for the Hages to assume that the Forest Service would back away from that
mandate, despite the fact that the regulation was not in place at the time the
Hages purchased the ranch in 1978.245  In addition, the court cannot base the
character of the governmental action upon the relationship between the parties,
but instead must consider whether the regulation is legitimate.246  Given the
Forest Service responsibility for management of public lands, it is likely that
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will find the regulation to
have been legitimate if the court analyzes the character of the governmental
action factor as intended.247
239 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a).
240 Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 212 (2008).
241 Dist. Intown Props. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
242 Estate of Hage, 82 Fed. Cl. at 206, 211.
243 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a); Public Rangelands Improvement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1901(b)(2)
(2006).
244 43 U.S.C. § 1901(b)(2).
245 Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 153, 156 (1996).
246 Dist. Intown Props. P’ship, 198 F.3d at 879.
247 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1732(a), 1901(b)(2).
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Recently, in Casitas, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
held that a required diversion of water for endangered species resulted in a
physical taking of water rights.248  However, the Hages’ claims are much more
tenuous than the claims made in the Casitas case.  In Casitas, there was an
actual diversion of water required by the Bureau of Reclamation and a con-
tracted water right.249  It is also important to note that the three Supreme Court
cases that did find water rights takings, involved diversions as well.250  How-
ever, in this case, the government did not intentionally divert the water for
another use; natural growth of vegetation prevented the water from reaching the
Hages’ ranch.251  Therefore, there was no actual government action, except the
effective denial of the permit to clear the ditches, and that government action
did not rise to the same level as requiring a diversion of water.  In addition, the
Hages did not have a contract for the water from the government agency in
question that would have given them the strength of a breach of contract claim
like in the Casitas case.252  Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit seems predisposed to find water rights takings after the Casitas case,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit can easily distinguish the
Estate of Hage case from the Casitas case because there is no physical diver-
sion of water.
VI. CONCLUSION
Water rights are a unique form of property because the rights are not
clearly possessory and can be transported off-site, making it possible for some-
one with a long enough “straw” to “drink someone else’s milkshake.”253  As
water resources become scarcer, water rights takings claims may become more
common in an attempt to protect those property rights.  Takings law is already
a complex and unclear area of law when dealing with land and other property
that is clearly possessory.254  Furthermore, the application of takings law to
water rights adds another layer of complexity because water rights are usufruc-
tuary and not subject to “absolute physical possession.”255  Despite this com-
plexity, case law has consistently found:  1) takings of water rights when actual
248 Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
249 Id. at 1281-82.
250 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 615, 620 (1963); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co.,
339 U.S. 725, 729-30, 752 (1950); Int’l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 405-06,
408 (1931).
251 Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 206 (2008).
252 Casitas, 543 F.3d at 1281.
253 Davenport & Bell, supra note 3, at 3; Sax, supra note 169, at 260; Andrew P.
Tauriainen, California’s Evolving Water Law:  The Water Rights Protection and Expedited
Short-Term Water Transfer Act of 1999, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 411, 415 (2000); THERE
WILL BE BLOOD (Paramount Vantage & Miramax Films 2007).
254 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1977); Daniel J.
Curtin, Jr., Foreword to TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES xxi, xxi (Thomas E. Roberts ed.,
2002) (“Takings law is notoriously complex, and a desire for clarity exists among many of
those who must deal with it.”).
255 Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 172 (1996); see Sax, supra note 169, at 260.
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diversions are involved;256 and 2) the state can regulate water rights for public
purposes.257 Estate of Hage is inconsistent with over seventy years of case
law.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit should overturn the
decision on appeal, not only to protect reasonable government regulation of
public property, but also to clarify the limits of water rights takings for future
cases.
256 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 615, 620 (1963); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co.,
339 U.S. 725, 729-30, 752 (1950); Int’l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 405-06,
408 (1931); Casitas, 543 F.3d at 1296.
257 Abelson, supra note 176, at 422.
